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RELIEF FROM EXTRADITION UNDER THE UIWORM
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT
W. J. BRocKELBAwK*
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (as amended)
hereinafter designated by URESA (or a substantially similar statute1 )
has been passed in 47 states, 2 the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and three
territories.3 Its proper interpretation is therefore important to the smooth
and uniform operation of the vast machinery now in use to make it
4
effective.
One of the most difficult problems has to do with the interpretation
of the provisions relating to extradition. These are Sections 5 and 6 which

follow:
PART 1--CIMIMAL ENFoRCEMMT

Section 5. Interstate Rendition. The Governor of this state (1)
may demand from the Governor of any other state the sur*Uniform Law Commissioner for the State of Idaho and Chairman of the
Committee on Desertion and Non-Support which drafted the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act. Professor of Law, University of Idaho.
1. Legislation that is sufficiently similar to permit reciprocity has been enacted
in Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, New York, South
Carolina and the Virgin Islands.
2. The only exception is Nevada.
3. The three territories are Alaska, Hawaii, and the Virgin Islands.
4. Before any of the recent legislation went into effect it was estinated by the
Director of the National Desertion Bureau that United States taxpayers were paying
about 205 million dollars a year for support of the families that should have been
supported by deserting bread winners. There are no recent estimates of what part of
this has been recaptured by the enforcement of duties of support under reciprocal
legislation. However, figures for New York City indicate that much has been accomplished. In 1951 collections in New York City courts on account of reciprocal support
cases amounted to $83,836; in 1953 this figure increased to approximately $475,000.
Zimmerman, Out of State Enforcement of Maintenance Obligations in the United
States. IumRs
RE RELEASEs, Vol. 31, p. 114 (an information service published by the
Common Council for American Unity, 20 West 40th Street, New York 18, New York).
(191)
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render of any person found in such other state who is charged in
in this state with the crime of failing to provide for the support
of any person in this state and (2) may surrender on demand
by the Governor of any other state any person found in this
state who is charged in such other state with the crime of failing
to provide for the support of a person in such other state. The
provisions for extradition of criminals not inconsistent herewith
shall apply to any such demand although the person whose surrender is demanded was not in the demanding state at the time
of the commission of the crime and although he had not fled
therefrom. Neither the demand, the oath nor any proceedings
for extradition pursuant to this section need state or show that
the person whose surrender is demanded has fled from justice,
or at the time of the commission of the crime was in the demanding or other state.
Section 6. Relief from the above Provisions. Any obligor contemplated by Section 5, who submits to the jurisdiction of the
court of such other state and complies with the court's order of
support, shall be relieved of extradition for desertion or nonsupport entered in the courts of this state during the period of
such compliance. 5
The first sentence of Section 5 is nothing more than a statement of
the powers of state governors existing by virtue of Article IV, Section 2,
paragraph 2 of the United States Constitution and congressional implementing legislation. 7 It is the two concluding sentences of Section 5 that
are of special significance. These free the extradition procedure from the
necessity of stating or showing that the person whose surrender is demanded was in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the

5. Discussion in this paper is based on the uniform text as recommended by the

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Some states, such
as Connecticut and Florida, have omitted these sections. Some uncertainty has
arisen as to whether URESA is a criminal or a civil statute. The uniform text is
divided into three parts entitled respectively: Part 1. General Provisions, Part II.
Criminal Enforcement, Part IIl Civil Enforcement. The uncertainty is due to
the fact that the legislatures of the enacting states have frequently omitted
the titles of the three parts above indicated. URESA is both a criminal and a
civil statute, and any particular action taken under it may be either criminal or
civil depending on the part of the statute coming into play.
6. The Constitutional text is as follows: "A person charged in any State with
treason, felony or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another
State, shall on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled,
be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime."
7. Congressional legislation may be found in 18 U.S.CA. §§ 3182-3195 (1951).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol19/iss3/1
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crime or had fled therefrom.8 They are especially desirable in all cases
of desertion and non support. Without them it would be necessary to
show that the defendant, before leaving the demanding state, had deserted
and had already formulated an intention not to support his family. In
most cases this is either not true or is impossible to prove. It is rare that
a man's intentions are clear. Frequently he may leave the state with little
or no intention other than to seek work, and only after the emotional ties
to his family have been loosened does he determine to desert and not
to support them. Thus these provisions become almost indispensable in
the support cases. Since they permit state governors to demand and surrender persons outside the class of criminals covered by Article IV,
Section 2, paragraph 2 of the United States Constitution, there can be no
constitutional objection.
The effect and scope of Section 6 has been the object of much
discussion. The important question is, to what obligor does it apply and
What exactly will relieve him of extradition?
To what obligor does it apply? It may be well to analyze the text

8. These provisions were inspired by the more general text of Section 6 of the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act which has been adopted in forty states. The
latter act has been held constitutional in Ex parte Morgan, 78 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.Cal.
1948); State ex rel. Gildar v. Kriss, 191 Md. 568, 62 A. 2d 568 (1948); People ex Tel.
Faulds v. Herberich, 93 N.Y.S. 2d 272 (2d Dep't 1948), affd 301 N.Y. 614, 93 N. E. 2d
913 (1949); Culbertson v. Sweeney, 70 Ohio App. 344, 44 N.E. 2d 807 (1942), appeal
dismissed, 140 Ohio St. 426, 45 NE. 2d 118 (1942); English v. Matowitz, 148 Ohio St.
39, 72 N.E. 2d 898 (1947); In re Acton, 90 Ohio App. 100, 103 N.E. 2d 577 (1949);
Ex parte Dalton, 56 N.M. 407, 244 P. 2d 790 (1952); Ex parte Bledsoe, 93 Okla. Crim.
App. 302, 227 P. 2d 680 (1951); Ex parte Coleman, 245 S.W. 2d 712 (Tex. Cr. 1952). See
Note, Constitutionality, construction and application of statute authorizing extradition
of the one who commits an act within the state or a third state resulting in a crime
in the demanding state, 151 AL.R. 239 (1944). In Ex parte Morgan, 86 CA. 2d 217, 194
P. 2d 800 (1948) the court said: "The Federal Statute (18 U.S.C.A. § 3182 carrying
into execution the constitutional provision of Art. IV, Section 2) does not purport to
cover the entire field of extradition. It mentions only one class of persons-those who
flee from the state.... The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act does not provide for
the extradition of persons of that class but covers persons of an entirely different
category-those who commit an act in one state intentionally resulting in a crime in
another state. Since each statute refers to a subject different and distinct from the
other, there is no conflict and each is enforceable in its own sphere." Certiorari was
denied by the Supreme Court, 338 U.S. 827 (1949). The constitutionality of URESA
has been upheld in Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W. 2d 373 (Ky. 1953) and State ex rel.
Bryant v. Fleming, 260 S.W. 2d 161 (Tenn. 1953). In Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 103
A. 2d 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1954) the defendant contended that the act was unconstitutional. The court did not consider the contention worthy of comment. See Brockelbank, Is the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act Constitutional? 17 Mo.
L. REv. 1, 8 (1952) and 31 ORE. L. REV. 97, 104 (1952). See also Note, Constitutional
Aspects of State Extradition Legislation, 28 IND. L. Ry. 662 (1953).
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rather literally to see what it says. Section 6 says "any obligor contemplated by Section 5... shall be relieved of extradition.. ." etc. There are
two classes of obligors mentioned in Section 5: (1) Those whom the
governor'of this state may be demanding from another state and (2) those
whom the governor of another state may be demanding of this state.
Pursuing this tack to the limit this means, as to the first class (those
whom the governor of this state may be demanding from the governor
of another state) that the governor of this state as a demanding state shall
relieve from extradition, that is shall not extradite, an obligor who submits to the jurisdiction of the "other state," which can only be in this
context the asylum state, and complies with an order of support of a court
of that state. This means as to the second class (those whom the governor
of another state may be demanding of this state) that the governor of this
state as a state on whom a demand is being made shall relieve from
extradition, that is shall not surrender, an obligor who submits to the
jurisdiction of the "other state", this time the demanding state, and complies with its order of support. More simply stated this means that the
demanding state shall not extradite obligors who comply with support
orders of asylum states and conversely asylum states shall not surrender
obligors who comply with support orders of demanding states.
Does this double barrelled directive make sense and did the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws really mean that
when they approved Section 6?
Let us see how these two rules which we have torn from the words
of Section 6 may operate in the crucible of application.
(1) The demanding state shall not extradite obligors who comply
with support orders of the asylum state. The procedure by which a
governor is pursuaded to demand a criminal defendant from another
state is informal. But until he takes action in the form of making the demand the rights of the defendant have been in no way affected and there
is no occasion, as there is no right, for him to bring legal proceedings of
any kind in the demanding state. The legal sufficiency of the demand and
the regularity of the requisition papers are always tested in habeas corpus
proceedings in the asylum state, and in the absence of special statutory
provisions this is the only method by which it can be done. 9
9. In re Heck, 122 W. Va. 175, 7 S.E. 2d 866 (1940). Apparently special statutory
provisions providing for proceedings somewhat analogous to habeas corpus before a
special court or judge exist in Ohio. Omo CoD. § 114 (Throckmorton's, 1936).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol19/iss3/1
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While the hand of the governor can be neither compelled nor stayed
a conscientious governor seeks only to do his duty under the law. His
duty is clear. He must not demand those who are complying with support
orders from other states.
Those whom the governor of the demanding state has no right to
demand, the governor of the asylum state has a duty to refuse to surrender. So we must attempt to answer the general question, with what
support orders must the obligor comply to be relieved of extradition?
From the point of view of the governor of the demanding state compliance must be with a support order regularly made.by a court of the
asylum state. For ought that appears in URESA this support order may
have issued from either a criminal or a civil court or may be the result of
quasi-criminal proceedings where although the form of the action is
criminal the judgment commands the defendant to furnish support. Of
course compliance with a support order of a court without jurisdiction
would not offer relief from extradition.
May the obligor, whose surrender is demanded, submit to the jurisdiction of the court of the asylum state on his own initiative and ask that
the court make a support order with which he can comply in order
to be relieved of extradition? The answer must certainly be no. Some
have thought the defendant should be given this right,10 but there are
overwhelming reasons why the text of Section 6 should not be given this
construction.
First, there is no such procedure in existence. A defendant does not
initiate proceedings. That is the role of the plaintiff. No court in the
asylum state has on its docket any action against him. If he is to submit,
it must be to attack or defend. He surely has no reason to attack. In
order to defend he must await a complaint against him.
Secondly there are important reasons why a new procedure of this
kind should not be created for his benefit. To be relieved of extradition
he must not only submit to the court's jurisdiction but also comply with
the court's order of support. But how could the asylum court properly
make an order of support? It has only one party before it, and an old

10. In re Floyd, 124 A.C.A. 413, 268 P. 2d 508 (April 1, 1954). Contra: opinion
of the Attorney General of California, No. 53/157, Jan. 14, 1954; Opinion of the
Attorney General of Ohio, No 30M, Augus 31, L353.
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saying has it that the absent are always in the wrong. The court could
only hear the defendant's evidence, for the plaintiff in no sense is before
the court. Any attempt to make an order of support under such circumstances would end, in most cases, in small and entirely insufficient token
payments, and thus for a song, the defendant would be able to purchase
immunity. This result varies little from the immunity which he enjoyed
before the act was passed and would violate and frustrate the purpose
of the act.
On the other hand the governor of the demanding state should not
demand extradition of a defendant who is complying with a support order
that is regularly made by a court of the asylum state. This will include a
support order that is the result of proceedings regularly begun under
URESA by a complaint filed by the plaintiff in the initiating state. Of
course Section 6 may include other support orders, such as one when the
plaintiff, instead of using URESA, goes to the responding state, sues the
defendant and obtains a support order. But it is probable that a support
order regularly obtained by the use of URESA was the one most present
in the minds of the Commissioners when they approved the text of
Section 6.
Now let us have a look at the picture from the point of view of the
asylum state. First, the governor of the asylum state has a duty to refuse
to surrender those whom the governor of the demanding state has no
right to demand. Who are they? As we have just pointed they are those
who are complying with a support order of the asylum state-but the
support order in question must be one regularly brought in a court of the
asylum state and not one that such a court makes on the ex parte submission of the defendant on his own initiative. Secondly, he must give
the defendant the benefit of the second part of directive of Section 6.
This has been stated above as follows:
(2) The asylum state shall not surrender obligors who comply with
support orders of the demanding state. How can an obligor comply with
the support order of the demanding state?
Of course it is unlikely that a demanding state is going to ask for
the surrender of such an obligor. However it could happen that the
obligor is now complying with a support order which a court of the
demanding state previously issued and this fact has been overlooked by
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol19/iss3/1
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the officials of the demanding state. If this is true his compliance should
relieve him of extradition.
What if the support order with which the defendant is complying
is old and because of changed conditions, such as the increased earning
capacity of the defendant coupled with the decreased purchasing power
of the dollar, calls for insufficient support? Support orders, like other
orders of courts, are valid until properly changed by a court having jurisdiction of the defendant. Until that has been done it is difficult to see how
the demanding state can indict him for a crime. But let us suppose that
for some mistaken reason he is indicted in the demanding state. Apart
from Section 6 the governor would be under a duty to surrender him.1 1
But the purpose of Section 6 is to relieve him of extradition, and I see
nothing unusual or abhorrent about such relief. There are still two
weapons lying unused in the armory of the demanding state. The indictment of the demanding state might be narrowed to the crime of
failure to supply support money in addition to or beyond the amount
called for by the old support order if, under the laws of the demanding
state, such a crime exists, or the demanding state may itself begin civil
proceedings under Section 8 of URESA which provides:
"Whenever a state or a political subdivision thereof furnishes
support to an obligee, it has the same right to invoke the provisions hereof as the obligee to whom the support was furnished
for the purpose of securing reimbursement of expenditure so
made and of obtaining continuing support."
The use of either of these weapons should be sufficient.
There is another possible way in which a defendant in the asylum
state can be complying with a support order of the demanding state.
Again this is unlikely but could happen. If the defendant has returned to
the demanding state, has submitted to the jurisdiction of its criminal
court, has been tried and, as a punishment, has been ordered to supply a
certain amount of support, has returned to the asylum state and is presently complying with the order of the court of the demanding state he

11. Note, Habeas Corpus to test the Sufficiency of Indictment or Information as
-regardsthe offense sought to be charged, 57 A.L.R. 85 (1928); Determination in
extradition proceedings whether crime is charged, 81 A.L.R. 552 (1932); Horowitz and
Steinberg, The FourteenthAmendment-Its Newly Recognized Impact on the "Scope"
of Habeas Corpus in Extradition, 23 So. CAL. L. Rzv. 441 (1950); Note, ExtraditionSufficiency of WarrantIssued by the Asylum State-Constructionof Uniform Criminal
ExtraditonAct, 2 ALiA. L. ERv. 346 (1950).
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should be relieved from extradition. This combination of circumstances
may occur due to the male volence or ill will of his spouse in the demanding state compounded by the complicity of its officials.
When it happens Section 6 should protect him.
To summarize the position here taken:
(1) Governors of demanding states should not extradite obligors who
comply with support orders of asylum states when such support orders
are the result of regular proceedings under URESA or other statutes in
the courts of the asylum state. No relief from extradition should be
given if the defendant merely on his own initiative submits to a court in
the asylum state and obtains an ex parte order to support the obligee.
(2) Conversely governors of asylum states should not surrender
obligors if they are being improperly demanded under (1) above or if
they are somehow complying with a valid support order of the demanding
state.
When the Commissioners approved URESA, they may have underestimated the importance of its criminal provisions. There was talk of the
uselessness of returning an unwilling husband to his family only to stop
his wages and brand him as a criminal. Experience under URESA has
shown that the criminal provisions can be most effectively used in the
case of the unstable runaway. 1 2 If the breadwinner is not well established
in the state where he is found, any intimation that proceedings may be
taken against him will cause him to move on to another state. There are
two ways in which his intention to escape may be foiled. Under the civil
proceeedings (Section 15) jurisdiction of the defendant may be obtained
by his arrest. Sometimes this is not permissible under the law of the
responding state. But where it is, it should be used more extensively
than it is used at present. Those dealing with the act are too often
unaware of this possibility and too often hesitate to use it. Then arrest
with a view to extradition is the other method that may be used to prevent his escape. When the defendant has been arrested he then knows for
a fact that his wandering days are over and that he must get down to
the serious business of supporting his family. This is the moment that

12. This view is the main point of a paper entitled "Some Procedural Problems

and Sugestions under URZSA" circulated by the Attorney General of 1Mfchigan.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol19/iss3/1
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practice has shown so often to be fruitful in results. The defendant,
many times, will pay at once and will agree to pay in the future, with
proper bond or security, a reasonable amount for the support of his
family. This is all the act ever meant to achieve. The fact that it is done
by use of the criminal proceedings more often than was contemplated by
the Commissioners is not important.
It is at this point that the provisions of Section 6 on relief from
extradition come into play. If he complies with an existing support order
of the asylum state he puts himself at once in the category of those
whose surrender should no longer be demanded and so he is relieved of
extradition. If he complies with an existing support order of the demanding state he is a direct beneficiary of Section 6 and the governor of the
asylum state "shall" relieve him of extradition. Outside these possibilities
there is only the informal bargain.
The governor of the asylum state must do his duty to the governor
of the demanding state. Conceivably the latter's demand for the body of
the defendant might be placated by a money payment and the well
secured promise of future payments. If they are not forthcoming the
defendant must be surrendered. What blood may be extracted from the
demanded stone after delivery is not a problem of the governor of the
asylum state.
In view of this discussion, should Section 6 be amended? First it is
not certain that an amendment would successfully clear the hurdles of
all the legislatures that have passed the act. It would be still more
uncertain if the news were to get around that the amended section meant
only what the old section, properly interpreted, meant anyway. Legislatures do not like to be asked to do such useless things. Finally were the
amendment passed some would say that it must have been for some purpose, and so could not mean what the old section meant. Then a three ring
mental circus is started. What did the old section mean? What was
wrong with it? How is it changed by the amendment? We can avoid a
pack of trouble by leaving well enough alone.
Were the question an original one and were all the wisdom of hindsight present to preside at the draftsman's conference, Section 6 might
have been as follows:
The Governor of this state shall not demand from any other
state the surrender of an obligor who is complying with the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1954
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order of support of a court of such other state and the Governor
of this state shall not surrender an obligor who is complying
with the order of support of a court of the demanding state.
But that is what the present text of Section 6 means now. So what
are we worrying about?

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol19/iss3/1
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